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WHEN RAPE VICTIMS' RIGHTS MEET
PRIVACY RIGHTS: MANDATORY HIV
TESTING, STRIKING THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT BALANCE
AbstracL As a result of the growing concern of rape victims about exposure to the AIDS
virus, many states have enacted legislation allowing for forced testing of suspected or convicted rapists for the purpose of releasing the results to victims. Because the United States
Supreme Court has yet to hear a fourth amendment challenge to any mandatory HIV
testing program, the constitutionality of testing is not settled. This Comment analyzes
mandatory HIV testing conducted for the purpose of informing the rape victim of her
assailant's status and concludes that such testing is a violation of the fourth amendment
because it does not achieve the government's asserted goals.

AIDS1 is a frightening and fatal disease. As the number of people
infected with 1IW has grown,3 so has the panic and hysteria surrounding the disease. Politicians have reacted to the public's erroneous fear that AIDS is highly contagious by proposing numerous
legislative programs intended to prevent the spread of the disease.4
Many of these proposals call for testing and quarantine programs
under circumstances the scientific community has called unwarranted
and absurd.' As a result, the dangers posed by AIDS now stretch
beyond its infectious and lethal nature and extend to the threat it poses
to fourth amendment rights.
Some of the greatest challenges posed by AIDS confront public
policymakers and judges attempting to balance the needs and desires
of a fearful public against the rights of those carrying or suspected of
carrying the virus. The difficulty of striking this balance of interests is

most acute when the health concerns of rape victims conflict with the
constitutional rights of convicted or suspected rapists. Because HIV

can be transmitted through sexual contact, the argument in favor of
testing rapists is intuitively compelling. Rape victims assert a need to

1. AIDS is an acronym for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. BLACK'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 20 (36th ed. 1990).
2. HIV is an acronym for Human Immunodeficiency Virus. HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNAL MEDICINE 1402 (12th ed. 1991) [hereinafter HARRISON'S]. HIV has been isolated as
the cause'of AIDS. Id. at 1403.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 18-23.
4. See infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
5. Field, Testingfor AIDS: Uses and Abuses, 16 Am. J. LAW & MED. 34, 45 n.44 (1990).
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know the HIV status of their assailants to protect their own health and
6
the health of those with whom they come in contact.
Despite the natural sympathy the public and lawmakers feel for victis of sexual assault, compulsory HIV testing is a violation of the
fourth amendment's proscription against unreasoiaable searches and
seizures. Mandatory testing violates the fourth amendment because
the asserted purposes of testing-protecting the victim's physical and
mental health, and the health of those she7 comes in contact with-are
not demonstrably furthered by testing. The Supreme Court should
overturn statutes allowing states to force an individual convicted or
charged with rape to submit to an AIDS test for the purpose of
informing an assault victim of her assailant's HIV status.
I. AIDS
A.

The Medical Background

AIDS actually refers to a progressive spectrum of conditions, rather
than a single, identifiable disease.' The first is asymptomatic and seronegative HIV infection.9 During this initial period, the infected individual has no outward symptoms and an insuffcient build-up of
antibodies to test positive using any of the current diagnostic tests. 10
This stage is followed by seroconversion, the process by which the
body produces antibodies to the viral infection.1 1 After these initial
stages of infection, many patients develop AIDS-related complex
(ARC).12 ARC is a constellation of chronic symptoms such as weight
loss, intermittent fever, chronic diarrhea, and anemia. 3 The final
stage is generally termed full-blown AIDS.' 4 The full-blown syndrome consists of any of the ARC symptoms combined with the development of opportunistic infections, secondary cancers and/or a
6. Report of The PresidentialCommission on the Human Immunoleficiency Virus Epidemic
131 (1988); see also Bedward, Aids Testing ofRape Suspect" Have the Rights of the Accused Met
Their Match?, 1990 ILL L. REv. 347.
7. Although not all rape victims are female, the vast majority of rapes involve men attacking
women. For the purpose of clarity, this Comment will use the feminine pronoun when referring
to the assault victim and the masculine pronoun when referring to the assailant.
8. HARRISON'S, supra note 2, at 1403.
9. THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 290 (15th ed. 1987) [hereinafter
MERCK MANUAL].

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

292.
290.
290-91.
291.
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variety of neurologic disorders. 15 Studies suggest that it is extremely

likely a person infected with HIV will eventually develop AIDS. 6
The current estimated period from HIV infection to AIDS is approxi17
mately four months to ten years.
In the ten-year period since the disease was first recognized by the
Center for Disease Control (CDC), the recorded incidences of infection and mortality have grown at an alarming rate. By mid-1990
approximately 122,000 cases of AIDS had been reported in the United
States." By 1992 that number may reach 365,000.19 Moreover,
because AIDS is only the end point on the continuum of HIV infection, the number of reported cases does not accurately reflect the
number of people capable of transmitting the virus.20 The CDC currently estimates that one to one-and-a-half million people in the
United States are infected with HIV. 2 ' AIDS has emerged as a leading

cause of death among Americans between the ages of 25 and 44.22
From 1981 through 1990, the CDC recorded 100,777 deaths among
individuals with AIDS.2 3
Despite its alarming rate of growth, HIV is not a highly contagious
or an easily transmitted virus. 2 4 In fact, the only significant modes of
transmission require very intimate contact with an HIV carrier. These
modes include sexual contact-including heterosexual intercourse 2 5parinatal exposure, breast feeding, and exposure to blood or blood
26
products, such as by transfusion or needle sharing.
15. Two rare diseases that are indicative of AIDS are Kaposi's sarcoma and pneumocystis
carinii pneumonia. Id.
16. THE AIDS KNOWLEDGE BAsE 1.1.6-1-3 (1990).
17. Id. at 1.1.7-1 (citing Medley, Anderson, Cox, Billard, Incubation Period of AIDS in
PatientsInfected via Blood Transfusion. 328 NATURE 719 (1987)).
18. HARRISON'S, supra note 2, at 1403.
19. Id.

20. CDC, AIDS and Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in the United States" 1988
Update, 38 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP., Supp. S-4 at 41 (May 12, 1989).
21. Guttmacher, HIVInfection: Individual Rights v. Disease Control, 17 J.L. & Soc'y 66, 67

(Spring 1990); CDC, HIV PrevalenceEstimates andAIDS Case Projectionsfor the UnitedStater"
Report Based on a Workshop, 39 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 1 (Nov. 30, 1990).
22. CDC, Mortality Attributable to HIV Infection/AIDS-United States, 1981-1990, 40
MORBIDrrY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 41 (Jan. 25, 1991).
23. Ia.
24. Friedland & Klein, Transmission of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 317 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1125, 1133 (1987).

25. Krim, AIDS: The Challenge to Science & Medicine in AIDS: The Emerging Ethical
Dilemmas, 15 HASTINGS CENTER REP. (Spec. Supp.) 2 (1985).
26. Friedland & Klein, supra note 24, at 1132.
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HIV Testing Proceduresand Reliability

"AIDS testing" is a misnomer because there is currently no test for
AIDS.2 7 Instead, current tests detect the presence of antibodies to
HIV produced by the body in an attempt to fight off the disease.2 8 An
individual is considered to have tested positive for HIV when a series
of antibody tests are consistently reactive.2 9
Although the CDC considers currently available HIV tests highly
reliable,30 the tests are subject to error from a variety of sources.31
These sources include sample mishandling, 2 human error,33 and most
27. Field, supra note 5, at 37-38.
28. Id.
29. Schwartz, Dans, & Kinosian, Human Immunodeficiency Virus Test Evaluation,
Performanceand Use, 259 J. A.M.A. 2574, 2578 (1988). Diagnostic testing begins with an initial
screening test. The enzyme-immunoassay (EIA), also called the enzyme-linked immunosorbent
assay (ELISA), is the most widely used screening test because it is relatively low cost, has
standardized procedures, is highly reproducible and has rapid turn-around. Id. at 2574-75. If
the first EIA is non-reactive, the testing sequence usually terminates. If the initial EIA is
reactive, it is repeated, usually twice. IaMat 2578. Once a reactive result has been reproduced on
subsequent EIAs, the blood sample is subjected to a confirmatory test, usually the Western Blot
(WB). Field, supra note 5, at 38.
30. CDC figures on test efficacy are derived from the Model Performance Evaluation
Program (MPEP). CDC, Serologic TestingforHIV-1 Antibody-United States, 1988 and 1989, 39
MORBIDrrY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 380 (June 8, 1990). The accuracy of a clinical test is
determined both by its sensitivity and its specificity. Test sensitivity refers to the proportion of
infected specimens a test actually detects, while specificity refers to the percentage of noninfected samples a test reads as non-reactive. Id. at 382. MPEP figures from 1989 indicated that
sensitivity of the EIA was 99.3% and specificity was 99.7%. Id. For the WB, sensitivity was
98.9% and specificity 97.8%. Id.
31. The CDC itself admits that its figures should be interpreted cautiously because the
methodology of the MPEP is less than optimal for determining performance of the tests under
average testing conditions. Id. at 383. One major problem is that the proficiency figures come
from laboratories that voluntarily participate in the program and are thus aware that results from
testing on certain samples will be used to evaluate the lab's performance. See id at 380. This
provides a greater incentive to avoid any possible errors by creating optimal laboratory
conditions for the tests. Schwartz, Dans & Kinosian, supra note 29. at 2577. The CDC has
acknowledged that its figures may only be achieved under such optimal conditions. CDC, Public
Health Service Guidelines for Counseling and Antibody Testing to P,'event HIV Infection and
AIDS, 36 MORBmrry & MORTALrrY WEEKLY REP. 509, 510 (Aug. 14, 1987) [hereinafter
Public Health Service Guidlines].
32. Schwartz, Dans & Kinosian, supra note 29, at 2577.
33. Public Health Service Guidlines, supra note 31, at 510. Neither the EIA nor the WB
produces a result that is definitively reactive or nonreactive. Instead, both produce results that
are measured on a spectrum. Testers can select a variety of cut-off points along a continuous
scale to divide a reactive result from a nonreactive one. Schwartz, Dans & Kinosian supra note
29, at 2576. As the cut-off point moves along the continuum to require either stronger or less
strong evidence as the basis for a reactive reading, the relative levels of sensitivity and specificity
move accordingly. Id. Because of this lack of a universal standard, the tests require subjective
interpretation by the testing laboratory and are particularly subject to observer variability. Id. at
2575; Note, ConstitutionalQuestions." Mandatory Testing for AIDS Under Washington's AIDS
Legislation, 24 GONZAGA L. REv. 433, 443 (1988-89).
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importantly, the scientific limitations of the tests in detecting antibodies to HIV during the virus' latency period.34
The most insurmountable risk of false negative35 readings on sero-

logical HIV tests results from the timing of the test in relation to the
time of exposure to the virus. The absence of antibodies does not
mean there is no HIV infection. During the very early stages of infection, prior to seroconversion, antibody tests cannot detect the virus.36
Despite the presence of the virus, the antibodies simply are not yet
present in the infected person's body.37
Most individuals undergo seroconversion and produce detectable
levels of HIV antibodies within six to twelve weeks of infection.38
However, many individuals may have an extended latency period

before seroconversion and a few infected individuals may never test
positive for the virus.39 Although these people test negative on the
standard HIV tests, because they are actually infected, they are capable of spreading the disease.' Because the latency period is a function
of the body's reaction to the virus, many false negatives cannot be
remedied using current testing technology.4 1
C. Statutory Testing Schemes
Both national and state governments have reacted to the hysteria
surrounding the AIDS epidemic with a deluge of legislation.4 2 All
fifty states and the District of Columbia currently have laws relating to
AIDS or HIV.4 3 Several states have responded to the concerns of sex34. See supra text accompanying notes 8-11.
35. A false negative refers to a test result indicating that the sample is not infected when, in
fact, the individual does carry the virus.
36. See supra text accompanying notes 8-11.
37. See supra text accompanying notes 8-11.
38. Pubic Health Service Guidelines, supra note 31, at 509.
39. Cleary, Barry, Mayer, Brandt, Gostin & Fineberg, Compulsory PremaritalScreeningfor
the Human Immunodeficiency Viru, 258 J. A.M.A. 1757, 1758 (1987); Imagawa, Lee, Wolinsky,
Sano, Morales, Kwok, Sninsky, Nishanian, Giorgi, Fahey, Dudley, Visscher & Detels, Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1 Infection in Homosexual Men Who Remain Seronegativefor
ProlongedPeriods, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1458, 1460 (1989) [hereinafter Imagawa]. One study
documented a group of 27 men from whom HIV-1 was isolated through viral cultures but who
remained seronegative for up to 36 months. Id at 1461. The authors of this study suggest there
may be some people who harbor the virus but would never test positive on a serological test. Id
40. Campbell, Mandatory AIDS Testing and Privacy: A Psycholegal Perspective, 66 N.D.L.
REv. 449, 456 (1990).
41. Field, supra note 5, at 42. There is evidence that a new generation of better tests are
currently in the developmental stages. Id at 38 n.15.
42. See generally Gostin, Public Health Strategiesfor Confronting AIDS, Legislative and
Regulatory Policy in the United States, 261 J. A.M.A. 1621 (1989).
43. Id. at 1621-23 (charts).
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ual assault victims by enacting laws allowing courts to order HIV testing and provide the results to rape victims.' Some of these states
limit compelled testing to assailants actually convicted of rape,4
while other states compel testing46when a defendant is formally charged
or indicted for a sexual assault.
D.

Special Needs Balancing Test Under the Fourth Amendment

Several state and lower federal courts have addressed the issue of
whether mandatory HIV testing in a variety of contexts, including sexual assault, is constitutional under the fourth amendment.4 7 These
courts' rulings vary depending on the particular circumstances of the
case, the individual to be tested, and the purpose fo:r testing. Although
the Supreme Court has not yet heard a fourth amendment challenge to
HIV testing, the Court has developed two fourth amendment doctrines that will certainly apply when an HIV testing case arises. The
two elements of fourth amendment doctrine most relevant to determining whether compulsory HIV testing is reasonable are the Court's
44. Weisenhaus, The Shaping ofAIDS Law, Nat'l L.L, August 1, 1988, at 30, col. 2; see also
statutes cited infra notes 45 and 46.
45. See, e-g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-5-3(g) (West Supp. 1989); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 23-07-07.5(1)(b) (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.24.340 (West Supp. 1990).
46. See, eg., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524.1 (West Supp. 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-415
(West Supp. 1989); TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 21.31 (Vernon 1989). Testing individuals
who are merely accused of rape raises other constitutional issues including due process and
presumption of innocence. Moreover, the fourth amendment concern is more acute when an
individual is merely accused. This distinction is, however, beyond the scope of this Comment,
which addresses the value of testing for the purpose of informing the victim regardless of the
individual's legal status.
47. See, eg., Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs of Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990)
(nurse's fourth amendment rights not violated when he was discharged for refusing to submit
results of his HIV test to hospital officials); Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188 (10th Cir. 1989)
(prison's interest in treating infected prisoners and preventing further transmission of AIDS
outweighed prisoner's limited expectation of privacy), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 871 (1990); Glover
v. Eastern Nebraska Community Office of Retardation, 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir.) (health services
agency policy requiring employee testing invalid because risk of tran.mmission in the work place
was trivial to the point of nonexistence), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 321 (1989); Virgin Islands v.
Roberts, 756 F. Supp. 898 (D.V.I. 1991) (state's interest in providing rape victim with assailant's
HIV status outweighed invasion of defendant's privacy); Harris v. Thigpen, 727 F. Supp. 1564
(M.D. Ala. 1990) (testing of prison inmates constitutional because testing is reasonably related to
a legitimate penological interest); Love v. San Francisco, 226 Cal. App. 3d 736, 276 Cal. Rptr.
660 (1990) (forced testing of individual convicted of soliciting an act of prostitution valid because
state's interest in stemming sexually transmitted spread of AIDS outweighed minimal invasion of
a blood test); Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1255, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1990)
(forced testing constitutional because state's interest in protecting public safety employee
outweighed privacy interest of individual who bit a peace officer); State v. Farmer, 116 Wash. 2d
414, 805 P.2d 200 (trial court's order requiring convicted sex offender to submit to HIV test
before sentencing reversed because test results would be of no use in ccrroborating testimony that
he had AIDS prior to soliciting juvenile prostitutes), corrected, 812 P.2d 858 (Wash. 1991).

200
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"special needs" analysis and the balancing test used to analyze the
reasonableness of searches.
L

The "'SpecialNeeds" Threshhold

Administrative searches have spawned a unique category of fourth
amendment doctrine known as "special needs" analysis. In the criminal context, the Court has traditionally adhered to the warrant based
on probable cause for meeting the fourth amendment's reasonableness
standard.4 8 Nevertheless, the Court has long recognized a separate
category of regulatory or administrative searches that are not directed
at the investigation of normal "street crime."" Administrative
searches are generally part of a regulatory scheme and involve activities such as building inspections, border stops, and inspections of pervasively regulated businesses, such as restaurants, gun shops, and
junkyards.50 Administrative searches are usually for conditions that
have no outward manifestations that would provide the government
with probable cause to search. The Court developed the "special
needs" doctrine specifically to analyze the validity of these administrative searches.
In general, the fourth amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures."1 If a government action is deemed to
be "a search," the constitutional question is whether the search is reasonable.5 2 In the area of administrative searches, the Court has developed a balancing test that weighs individual rights against government
interests to determine whether a search is reasonable.53 Before the
Court will apply the balancing test in place of probable cause, however, it must determine that the search in question presents "special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement." 54 Whether a
"special need" exists depends on whether a warrant and probable
48. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
49. C. WH1TEBR-AD & C. SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 267 (2d ed. 1986).
50. Id. at 267-95.
51. U.S. CONsT. amend IV. The amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
52. Junker, The Structureof the FourthAmendment The Scope of the Protection, 79 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1105 (1989).
53. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
54. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
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cause would be impracticable in light of the circumstances surrounding the search. 5
2.

The Fourth Amendment Balancing Test

Once the Court determines that a special need exists, it moves into
the balancing test to determine whether the warrantless search was
reasonable. To determine whether a search is constitutional using the
special needs balancing analysis, the Court considers all the circumstances surrounding the search and determines whether the government's need to conduct the search without a warrant outweighs the
6
individual privacy violated by searching.1
The Supreme Court first used the balancing test in Schmerber v.
California,57 a criminal search case involving a bodily invasion, specifically, blood extraction." In Schmerber, the Court did not use the balancing test to replace the probable cause requirement, but rather to
enhance the probable cause standard when exigent circumstances rendered it impracticable for police to obtain a warrant.59 Since Schmerber, the balancing test has primarily developed in the context of
administrative searches where the Court has abandoned the warrant
requirement and now allows searches conducted according to statutory schemes where the state's interest in searching outweighs the privacy invasion perpetrated on the individual to be searched.
The test was most clearly described in Camara v. MunicipalCourt. 0
The Camara Court held that administrative search warrants need not
be based on probable cause. 6 1 Because administrative searches usually
address conditions such as housing code violations which have no outward manifestations, the traditional probable cause standard is rendered impracticable.62 Rather, if the government interest served by
the search outweighs any invasion of privacy the subject of the search
might suffer, the government may issue an administrative warrant.6 3
55. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 628 (1989) (probable cause
was rendered impracticable because drug dependence generates few, if any, outward signs that
would form the basis of individualized suspicion).
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

202

Id. at 619.
384 U.S. 757 (1966).
Id.
Id. at 770-71.
387 U.S. 523 (1967).
Id. at 536-37.
Id at 537.
d at 536-37.
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3. FactorsAffecting the Special Needs Balancing Test
Through the Court's use of the special needs balancing approach to
resolve fourth amendment issues, four relevant factors have emerged.
Two factors relate to consideration of privacy. First, the court considers the level of privacy expectation held by the individual to be
searched. Second, the Court weighs the invasiveness of the proposed
search. The additional two factors relate to the government's interest.
First, the Court considers the magnitude of the government interest
served by the search. Second, the Court studies the utility of the proposed search in serving that interest.
a

Expectation of Privacy

The Court has frequently used the vehicle of a diminished expectation of privacy to minimize the interest of an individual in not being
subjected to a particular search. For example, the Court upheld warrantless searches of personal belongings of school children, reasoning
that a student's expectation of privacy in personal belongings was
diminished because of the regulated environment of the school." The
Court has also held that prisoners have a reduced expectation of privacy.6 5 In Hudson v. Palmer,the Court stated that the inherent conditions of incarceration are fundamentally incompatible with an
expectation of privacy.6 6
Most notably, the Court has recognized that under certain conditions, an individual may even have a decreased expectation of privacy
regarding his or her bodily integrity.6 7 Recently, the Court recognized
a reduced expectation of privacy in one's bodily fluids resulting merely
from certain types of public employment.6 8 In Skinner v. Railway
LaborExecutives'Association,69 the Court upheld a scheme for testing
the blood and urine of railroad employees involved in major rail accidents.7 0 The Court validated the test despite a lack of probable cause
64. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
65. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527-28 (1984) (right of privacy incompatible with the
close and continual surveillance of inmates and cells that is required to ensure institutional

security).
66. Id
67. See, eg., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979) (upheld warrantless and suspicionless
body cavity searches of pre-trial detainees who had contact visits with people from outside the
prison population because preventing introduction of contraband into the prison population
qualified as a "special need").
68. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); National Treasury
Employees' Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
69. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).

70. Id

203
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or individualized suspicion that any employee was actually engaged in
drug use. 71 The Court stated that railroad employees have a lessened
expectation of privacy because they work in a higlly regulated industry.72 Similarly, in National Treasury Employees' Union v. Von
Raab,7 3 the Court upheld drug testing of customs employees seeking
promotions to positions involved in drug interdiction and those currently in positions that require a person to carry firearms. 7n The Court
noted that individuals who have chosen to work in these positions
have a reduced expectation of privacy because of the physical and ethical demands of the job.7 5 Thus, through Bell, Skinner, and Von Raab,
the Court has recognized instances where a person's condition or position can decrease his or her expectation of bodily privacy.
b. Invasiveness of the Search
A government-imposed invasion of an individual's body to obtain
evidence or information presents a special class of search. When a
government-imposed search requires a bodily invasion, there is a
strong presumption in favor of a warrant requirement. 76 The Court
has repeatedly stated that there is a heightened concern when a search
intrudes beyond the body's surface.7 7 In fact, the Court indicated that
some bodily intrusions may be impermissible even if the government
has a warrant.78 This special concern over bodily invasions stems from
the damage to personal dignity resulting from such a search.7 9
Nevertheless, blood extraction is not considered a substantial invasion for fourth amendment purposes. The Court has repeatedly contradicted its oft-stated concern over bodily intrusions by consistently
diminishing the significance of the invasion involved in blood extraction.8" Specifically, the Court has noted that blood tests are "commonplace" and cause "virtually no risk, trauma or pain" when
conducted under medical conditions. 8 In Schmerberv. California,the
Court employed a balancing analysis as an added safeguard to a prob71. Id at 634.
72. Id at 627.
73. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).

74. Id at 679.
75. Id at 670, 672.
76. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966).
77. See, e-g., id at 769-70.
78. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985).
79. Id.
80. See, eg., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 625 (1989);
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
81. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
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able cause requirement when a warrantless search involved blood
extraction. 2 More recently, the Court moved a step further and
applied the balancing approach to validate administrative searches
involving bodily invasions even when probable cause was totally
83
lacking.
Magnitude of the Government Interest

c.

A critical element of the special needs balancing analysis is the significance of the asserted government purpose for conducting the
search. Recent cases provide three examples. First, in Bell v. Wofish,
the Court reasoned that body cavity searches of pre-trial detainees
were reasonable in light of the unique exigencies of prison life.84 Specifically, the Court noted that the need to prevent the introduction of
contraband into the prison was of vital importance in maintaining the
safety and security of the prison.8" In Von Raab, the Court focused on
the special government need posed by the drug crisis in this country.8 6
The majority concluded that the government had a compelling interest
in preventing drug users from being promoted to positions in the Customs Service where they might endanger the integrity of the nation's
borders or the lives of citizens. 87 Third, in Skinner, the Court held
that insuring the safety of public transportation constituted a vital
government interest. In each of these instances, the government interest was significant enough to warrant increased government
intrusiveness.
d.

Utility of the Search

Regardless of the magnitude of an asserted government interest, a
search is unreasonable if the government's purpose is not demonstrably furthered by the search.8 8 The government must not only assert a
vital interest, it must prove the utility of the search in serving that
interest.8 9 Under Delaware v. Prouse,9I the utility requirement means
that the government must prove its search is sufficiently productive to
82. Id. at 768-72.
83. See, eg., National Treasury Employees' Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989);
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-59 (1979).

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.
Id.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668-69.
Id. at 670, 672.
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979).
Id
Id at 648.
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justify intrusion upon an individual's fourth amendment rights.91 In
Prouse, the Court applied the balancing analysis to invalidate random
stops by police to check for unlicensed motorists or unregistered vehicles. 92 Although the Court acknowledged that the state had a vital
interest in ensuring that only qualified drivers were permitted to operate motor vehicles and that only safe vehicles were in operation, it
ruled random spot checks insufficiently productive to justify the
93
intrusion.
In both Skinner and Von Raab, the Court implicitly reaffirmed the
requirement that government searches have utility to be reasonable. 94
The Court upheld drug testing in both cases, reasoning that the vital
government interest in public safety was furthered by the deterrent
effect testing had on employee drug use. 95
II. HIV TESTING OF ACCUSED OR CONVICTED RAPISTS
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Forced HIV testing of accused or convicted rapists is unconstitutional because the privacy invasion inherent in testing outweighs any
government purpose actually served by the test. Although the government can advance an intuitively compelling argument in favor of testing, the argument is illusory. HIV tests simply do not accomplish
their well-intended purpose. Because the tests lack utility, the victim's, and therefore the government's, interest is unmet.
HIV testing falls within the framework of the fourth amendment
special needs balancing test used to judge the validity of drug testing.
Both drug testing and HIV testing programs are administrative
searches because they are conducted pursuant to a statutory scheme to
protect the public health and are not intended to uncover evidence of
crime.96 Furthermore, the probable cause and warrant standards are
impracticable because, in the early stages of infection, there are no
outward manifestations of HIV on which to base an inquiry. 97 Therefore, the issue posed in a fourth amendment challenge to HIV testing
is whether the asserted government interest in conducting the tests is
91. Id. at 658-59.
92. Id at 648.
93. Id at 658-59.
94. National Treasury Employees' Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 676 (1989); Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1989).
95. Van Roab, 489 U.S. at 676; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 629.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 48-50.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 9-10.
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sufficiently important to outweigh the expectations of privacy violated
by involuntary testing.
A. HIV Testing Violates Individual Privacy Rights
1. Accused or Convicted Rapists Have a Decreased Expectation of
Privacy
A convicted or suspected rapist has a diminished expectation of privacy with respect to a blood test for HIV. Arguably, the sexual
offender, by engaging in criminal behavior which is a known method
of AIDS transmission, has a reduced privacy expectation as to his
bodily fluids. Because AIDS can be transmitted through sexual contact, there is a direct nexus between the criminal behavior and the
government's action. Therefore, the offender should reasonably
expect that his blood will be tested for the virus.9" The assailant's own
actions work to weaken his expectation of privacy.
In addition, the offender's status either as a prison inmate after conviction or as a pretrial detainee while still a suspect diminishes his
expectation of privacy. Under Hudson v. Palmer99 or Bell v. Wolfish, " if the offender is imprisoned, he may have a reduced privacy
expectation as a natural concomitant of the conditions of incarceration."I The Court should not rely on Hudson and Bell in this context
because the government's compelling interest in institutional security,
which formed the basis for the prison cases,10 2 does not apply when
the purpose of the search is to benefit the victim rather than protect
the prison population. 0 3
2. Blood Tests for HIV Are Highly Invasive
Despite the accused or convicted rapist's arguably reduced expectation of privacy, there is undeniably a serious privacy invasion involved
98. Convicted rapists are those who have either admitted to the criminal activity or have been
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In the case of a suspected rapist, statutes generally
require a showing of probable cause or some statutorily defined level of suspicion that the
suspect actually engaged in the behavior before testing may be ordered. See, eg., CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1524.1(b)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1991) (defendant must first be charged, then the court
must make a finding of probable cause that the accused committed the offense and that an HIVtransmitting fluid was passed from the accused to the victim).
99. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
100. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
101. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 527-28; Bell, 441 U.S. at 537.
102. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526-27; Bell, 441 U.S. at 559-60.
103. Undeniably, there may be other purposes for a statute that permits testing of
incarcerated sex offenders, including protecting the health of other inmates and guards.
However, these purposes cannot be used to justify a statute that compels testing for the purpose
of informing the victim. This Comment addresses the latter type of statute.
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in forced HIV testing. HIV tests invade individual privacy on two
levels. First, the test requires the extraction of blood, which involves
an intrusion into the body. Second, the analysis of the blood reveals
medical information that compromises an individual's right to confidentiality in his medical information.
Although the Court has repeatedly minimized the invasiveness of
blood extraction, 1" a test for HIV is a highly invasive search. In particular, the fourth amendment implications of HIV tests go beyond the
initial affront to dignity caused by the forced extraction of blood.
These implications extend to the chemical analysis of the blood for the
presence of HIV. 05 Specifically, at the analysis stage of the search,
the individual's privacy interest in his or her otherwise privileged medical information is compromised. Unlike simple drug and alcohol
tests, HIV testing forces the individual to be diagnosed for a deadly
disease. Furthermore, the diagnosed individual must release the
results of the medical test to government authorities and to the assault
victim.106
Tests for HIV are not analogous to blood alcohol tests or drug tests
because the impact of a positive HIV test on an individual's life is far
more devastating. Although both are conducted without consent,10 7
tests for alcohol or drugs are only distasteful for their legal or perhaps
employment implications. HIV tests are considerably more disturbing
because the implications of a positive result reverberate through every
aspect of an individual's life. The psychological trauma is enormous.
One court equated a positive test with a death sentence. 10 8 Severe anxiety and depression are expected results. Studies have also documented an increased risk of suicide, homicide, and drug or alcohol
abuse associated with a positive test for HIV. 1°
The social ramifications of positive results are equally devastating to
the individual. Unlike most diseases, AIDS carries with it a tremen104. See supra text accompanying notes 80-83.
105. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989); Johnetta J. v.
Municipal Court, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1255, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666, 675 (1990).
106. The Court has recognized a constitutional right to privacy in the disclosure of medical
information. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (upholding a statute requiring physicians to
report recipients of certain prescription drugs to a registry becatse the risk of improper
dissemination of the information was unproven).
107. Forced medical treatment is not unprecedented in the United States. In the past the
courts have validated laws regarding immunization, disease reporting, compulsory examination
and treatment, and quarantine despite the laws' obvious impact on peisonal liberty. Clark, Aids
Prevention: Legislative Options 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 107, 130 (1990).
108. People v. Thomas, 139 Misc. 2d 1072, 529 N.Y.S.2d 429, 431 (Co. Ct. 1988).
109. Field, supra note 5, at 45 n.44; Marzuk, Tierney, Tardiff, Gross, Morgan, Hsu & Mann,
Increased Risk of Suicide in Persons with AIDS, 259 J. A.M.A. 1333 (1988).
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dous degree of social stigmatization. 11 0 The stigma derives from the
disease's original association with homosexual men and intravenous
drug users, people society has typically treated with disdain."1 Furthermore, because transmission of AIDS is associated with sexuality
and narcotics use, there is a strong tendency to condemn victims of the
disease.'

12

This stigma, magnified by the public's erroneous fear that the disease is highly contagious, has led to intense discrimination against victims of AIDS. The discrimination arises in virtually every aspect of
the individual's life, including insurance, employment, and personal
relationships." 3 The stigma that attaches to this disease is so strong,
it led one district court to note that an AIDS diagnosis signifies a
"social death as concrete as the physical one which follows.""H 4 For a

variety of psychological and social reasons, some people would rather
not know their infectious status and would choose not to be tested.
Forced AIDS testing deprives individuals of that choice.
B.

The Government's Asserted Interest Does Not Tip the Balance in
Favor of Testing

L

The Asserted Interest Is Significant

Government has an undeniably substantial interest in addressing
the health concerns of rape victims. The motivation behind statutes
that allow for testing of sex offenders is the victim's understandable
desire to know her assailant's HIV status. States assert that positive
test results provide the victim with information that may be important
to her in deciding whether to take precautions to avoid spreading the
virus.115 Alternatively, negative results may relieve the victim of a
baseless fear of infection." 6 In addition, states claim that any information about possible exposure could help the victim decide what
117
medical testing and treatment to pursue.
110. Guttmacher, supra note 21, at 66.

111. Id
112. Dunlap, AIDS and Discrimination in the United States Reflections on the Nature of
Prejudice in a Virus, 34 VILL. L. REv. 909, 917-20 (1989).
113. Id ; Guttmacher, supra note 21, at 66.
114. Virgin Islands v. Roberts, 756 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.V.I. 1991).
115. See, eg., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.95 (West 1990). The stated purpose is to
obtain information for the benefit of the exposed individual "in order that precautions can be
taken to preserve their health and the health of others or that such person can be relieved from
groundless fear of infection."

116. Id
117. Id.
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Because HIV is transmitted through sexual contact,1 18 a victim of
rape or any sexual assault involving transmission of a known HIV carrying bodily fluid logically fears infection.' 19 Providing a rape victim
with worthwhile information about whether she may have contracted
AIDS is the logical and humane course of action. Therefore, the issue
becomes whether test results from the offender provide the victim with
any useful information.
2.

Testing the Offender Lacks Utility

Unfortunately, HIV tests do not serve the interests of rape victims.
A government-imposed search must demonstrably further the government interest assertedly served by the intrusion to pass the fourth
amendment test.12 Therefore, the utility of HIV testing must be measured by the degree to which test results actually benefit the victim.
The test results must aid the victim's mental or physical health or
assist her making decisions about lifestyle changes that could help prevent the spread of the disease. Although it seems logical that knowing
the assailant's HIV status would be helpful to the victim, in reality, the
assailant's test results give the victim little or no useful information. 2
The victim is in the same position both medically and psychologically
regardless of whether she knows her assailant's test results because
22
those results tell her virtually nothing about her own status.1
For example, if the assailant tests negative, the victim's psychological trauma will continue unabated. Medical personnel must counsel
the victim that the result could be a false negative due either to the
failure rate of the tests or to the latency period between infection and
seroconversion.123 She must still speculate about her own status
because she can not assume that her assailant is n.ot a carrier of the
virus.12 The victim would still have to have herself periodically tested
and she would have to take precautions to inhibit the spread of the
virus. For example, she should not engage in unprotected sexual
activity, she should not become pregnant and if she is nursing, she
118.

See supra text accompanying note 25.
119. In light of this natural fear and mental anguish on the part of a rape victim, one New
York Court ordered testing for the victim's benefit because it was the "intelligent, humane,
logical, and proper course of action under the circumstances." People v. Thomas, 139 Misc. 2d
1072, 529 N.Y.S.2d 429, 431 (Co. Ct. 1988).
120. See supra text accompanying notes 88-95.
121. See Crim. Just. "Newsl., Apr. 17, 1989, at 3, col. 2.
122. Id.
123. See supra notes 31-41 and accompanying text.
124. Blumberg, Transmission of the AIDS Virus Through Criminal Activity, 25 CRIM. L.
BULL. 454, 460 (1989); see also supra notes 31-41 and accompanying text.

210

Rape and Mandatory HIV Testing
should stop.1 2 5 Furthermore, if she is employed in a position, such as
the health care field, where the risk of transmission may be high, she
must take special precautions to avoid spreading the virus.' 26
Moreover, providing the victim with a negative test result may do
more harm than good. The victim may choose to disregard counseling
about the latency period and accept the negative test result with a false
sense of security. In this case, the victim may decline to be regularly
tested, thereby putting her own health in jeopardy because if she is
infected it may not be detected at the earliest possible point. She may
also act recklessly, increasing her chances of spreading the virus by
donating blood, breast feeding, or engaging in unprotected sexual
activity.
Alternatively, a positive test result is likely to unnecessarily frighten
and traumatize the victim. A positive result of the assailant is inconclusive as to the victim's HIV status and can serve only to exacerbate
the victim's fear. First, there is the possibility of a false positive resulting from the flaws of the testing procedures.1 27 Second, the fact that
the attacker is positive for HIV only means that the victim has been
exposed, not that the exposure will actually result in infection. 2 ' In
fact, the risk of infection from a single exposure involving heterosexual
assault may be very slight.12 9 Available data indicates that the virus
is
130
more likely transmitted through multiple exposures over time.
Finally, a positive test of the assailant several weeks and perhaps
months after the assault does not tell the victim when her assailant
became infected. It is entirely possible that infection may have
occurred some time after the attack, perhaps while the defendant was
in jail awaiting trial.' 3 ' Despite these scientific facts, a victim, faced
with the knowledge that her assailant is seropositive for HIV will
undoubtedly suffer tremendous psychological trauma while awaiting
the onset of a disease that may never occur.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
126. See, eg., CDC, Possible Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus to a Patient
During an Invasive Dental Procedure, 39 MORBIDTrrY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP'. 489
(January 18, 1991); CDC, Recommendationsfor Prevention of HIV Transmission in Health-Care
Settings, 36 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 95 (Supp. August 21, 1987).

127. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
128. Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1255, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666, 670 (1990)
(referring to declarations of petitioner's experts presented at lower court hearing).
129. Blumberg, supra note 124, at 458. Gostin, of the Society of Law and Medicine, has
estimated that the risk of transmission through a single sexual encounter is 1 in 1000. Crim. Just.
Newsl., supra note 121, at 3.
130. Friedland & Klein, supra note 24, at 1133.
131. Note, AIDS, Rape and the FourthAmendment: Schemes for MandatoryAIDS Testing of
Sex Offenders, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1607, 1632 (1990).
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Test results of the attacker can not tell the victim anything conclusive about her own HIV status. In reality, the only way for any person
132
to know if she has been infected with HIV is to have herself tested.
Therefore, the victim is in virtually the same position whether or not
she is provided with test information from the assailant. Either way
she must have herself periodically tested for HIV and she should take
precautions to avoid transmitting the virus.
In addition to the absence of any psychological benefits, testing an
attacker can do nothing to benefit the victim's phtsical health. The
unfortunate reality is that AIDS is incurable.' 3 3 If the victim has in
fact been infected during the assault, a test of the assailant cannot save
her life.
Proponents of testing point to medical evidence that suggests that
early intervention with zidovudine (AZT) may delay the onset of
AIDS or prevent infection entirely. 134 AZT intervention is not a reasonable justification for testing for two reasons. First, AZT is highly
toxic13 5 and there are several adverse side effects to treatment. These
side effects include bone marrow suppression resulting in anemia often
requiring transfusions,1 36 and neutropenia, a condition associated with
37
acute leukemia, infection, arthritis and chronic spleen enlargement.1
It is unlikely that a doctor would prescribe AZT treatment to a person
when it is extremely uncertain whether she is at risk of developing the
infection. Second, the studies that are used to support the theory that
AZT may prevent development of the infection are not applicable to
victims of sexual assault. The studies were conducted on health care
workers where it was possible to administer treatment immediately
following exposure.' 38 The extremely short time interval between
exposure and treatment appears to be a critical aspect of the therapy. 139 This dramatically reduced time frame is impossible in the sex
offender context due to the realities of modem criminal procedure.

132. Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1255, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666, 670 (1990)
(referring to declarations of petitioner's experts presented at lower court hearing).
133. HARRISON'S, supra note 2, at 1410.
134. Johnetta, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 672; Field, supra note 5, at 44.
135. Field, supra note 5, at 103.
136. HARRISON'S, supra note 2, at 1409.
137. MOSBY'S MEDICAL, NURSING AND ALLIED HEALTH DICTIONARY 810 (3d ed. 1990).

138. Field, supra note 5, at 103.
139. HARRIsON's, supra note 2, at 1409.
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III.

CONCLUSION

Mandatory HIV testing of sex offenders is unconstitutional. When
the Supreme Court is eventually confronted with a fourth amendment
challenge to a sex offender testing scheme it should strike down the
program. Applying the special needs balancing analysis, the Court
should determine that, despite the reduced expectation of privacy of
the offender, the privacy invasion imposed by testing is extraordinary.
Furthermore, despite the considerable importance of responding to
rape victims' needs, the government interest side of the constitutional
balance is undermined by the lack of utility in HIV testing. Given
that the results do not benefit the victim and in some cases may actually be counterproductive, the government is unable to meet its constitutional burden of proving that the search serves its intended purpose.
The balance should therefore be struck in favor of individual privacy.
Bernadette PrattSadler
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